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Abstract. We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which
there may be uncertainty about the agents’ preferences due to limited
information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty:
(1) lottery model — in which for each agent, there is a probability dis-
tribution over linear preferences, (2) compact indifference model — for
each agent, a weak preference order is specified and each linear order
compatible with the weak order is equally likely and (3) joint probabil-
ity model — there is a lottery over preference profiles. For each of the
models, we study the computational complexity of computing the sta-
bility probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with
the highest probability of being stable. We also examine more restricted
problems such as deciding whether a certainly stable matching exists.
We find a rich complexity landscape for these problems, indicating that
the form uncertainty takes is significant.
1 Introduction
We consider a Stable Marriage problem (SM) in which there is a set of men
and a set of women. Each man has a linear order over the women, and each
woman has a linear order over the men. For the purpose of this paper we assume
that the preference lists are complete, i.e., each agent finds each member of the
opposite side acceptable.6 In the stable marriage problem the goal is to compute
a stable matching; a matching where no two agents prefer to be matched to
each other rather than be matched to their current partners. Unlike most of
∗ A preliminary version of this paper has been accepted for publication in the
proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT 2016).
6 We note that the complexity of all problems that we study are the same for com-
plete and incomplete lists, where non-listed agents are deemed unacceptable—see
Proposition 2 in Section 3.1.
the literature on stable matching problems [6, 11, 14], we assume that men and
women may have uncertainty in their preferences which can be captured by
various probabilistic uncertainty models. We focus on linear models in which
each possible deterministic preference profile is a set of linear orders.
Uncertainty in preferences could arise for a number of reasons both practical
or epistemological. For example, an agent could express a weak order because
the agent did not invest enough time or effort to differentiate between potential
matches and therefore one could assume that each linear extension of the weak
order is equally likely; this maps to our compact indifference model. In many real
applications the ties are broken randomly with lotteries, e.g., in the school choice
programs in New York and Boston as well as in centralized college admissions in
Ireland. However, a central planner may also choose a matching that is optimal
in some sense, without breaking the ties in the preference list. For instance,
in Scotland they used to compute the maximum size (weakly) stable matching
to allocate residents to hospitals [11]. We argue that another natural solution
could be the matching which has the highest probability of being stable after
conducting a lottery. Alternatively, there may be a cost associated with eliciting
preferences from the agents, so a central planner may want to only obtain and
provide a recommendation based on a subset of the complete orders [2].
As another example, imagine a group of interns are admitted to a company
and allocated to different projects based on their preferences and the prefer-
ences of the project leaders. Suppose that after three months the interns can
switch projects if the project leaders agree; though the company would prefer
not to have swaps if possible. However, both the interns and the project leaders
can have better information about each other after the three months, and the
assignment should also be stable with regard to the refined preferences. This ex-
ample motivates our lottery and joint probability models. In the lottery model,
the agents have independent probabilities over possible linear orders (e.g. each
project leader has a probability distribution on possible refined rankings over the
interns independently from each other). In the joint probability model, the proba-
bility distribution is over possible preference profiles and can thus accommodate
the possibility that the preferences of the agents are refined in a correlated way
(e.g. if an intern performs well in the first three months then she is likely to
be highly ranked by all project leaders). Uncertainty in preferences has already
been studied in voting [8] and for cooperative games [10]. Ehlers and Masso´ [3]
considers many-to-one matching markets under a Bayesian setting. Similarly, in
auction theory, it is standard to examine Bayesian settings in which there is a
probability distribution over the types of agents.
To illustrate the problem we describe a simple example with four agents. We
write b ≻ac to say that agent a prefers b to c and assume the lottery model.
Example 1. We have two men m1 and m2 and two women w1 and w2.
Each agent assigns a probability to each strict preference ordering as fol-
lows. (i) p(w1≻m1w2) = 0.4 and p(w2≻m1w1) = 0.6 (ii) p(w1≻m2w2) = 0.0
and p(w2≻m2w1) = 1.0 (iii) p(m1≻w1m2) = 1.0 and p(m2≻w1m1) = 0.0
(iv) p(m1≻w2m2) = 0.8 and p(m2≻w2m1) = 0.2. This setting admits two match-
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ings that are stable with positive probability: µ1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} and
µ2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}. Notice that if each agent submits the preference list
that s/he finds most likely to be true, then the setting admits a unique stable
matching that is µ2. The probability of µ2 being stable, however, is 0.48 whereas
the probability of µ1 being stable is 0.52.
1.1 Uncertainty Models
We consider three different uncertainty models:
– Lottery Model: For each agent, we are given a probability distribution
over strict preference lists.
– Compact Indifference Model: Each agent reports a single weak prefer-
ence list that allows for ties. Each complete linear order extension of this
weak order is assumed to be equally likely.
– Joint Probability Model: A probability distribution over preference pro-
files is specified.
Note that for the Lottery Model and the Joint Probability Model the rep-
resentation of the input preferences can be exponentially large. However, in
settings where similar models of uncertainty are used, including resident match-
ing [2] and voting [8], a limited amount of uncertainty (i.e. small supports) is
commonly expected and observed in real world data. Consequently, we consider
special cases when the uncertainty is bounded in certain natural ways including
the existence of only a small number of uncertain preferences and/or uncertainty
on only one side of the market.
Observe that the compact indifference model can be represented as a lottery
model. This is a special case of the lottery model in which each agent expresses
a weak order over the candidates (similar to the SMT setting [6, 11]). However,
the lottery model representation can be exponentially larger than the compact
indifference model; for an agent that is indifferent among n agents on the other
side of the market, there are n! possible linearly ordered preferences.
1.2 Computational Problems
Given a stable marriage setting where agents have uncertain preferences, various
natural computational problems arise. Let stability probability denote the prob-
ability that a matching is stable. We then consider the following two natural
problems for each of our uncertainty models.
– MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability: Given uncertain prefer-
ences of the agents, compute a matching with the highest stability probabil-
ity.
– StabilityProbability: Given a matching and uncertain preferences of the
agents, what is the stability probability of the matching?
3
Lottery Compact Joint
Problems Model Indifference Probability
StabilityProbability
#P-complete ? in P
in P for all three models if 1 side is certain
IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero NP-complete in P in P
IsStabilityProbabilityOne in P in P in P
ExistsPossiblyStableMatching in P in P in P
ExistsCertainlyStableMatching in P in P NP-complete
MatchingWithHighestStabilityProb
? NP-hard NP-hard
in P for all models if 1 side is certain and
there is O(1) number of uncertain agents
Table 1. Summary of results.
We also consider two specific problems that are simpler than StabilityProb-
ability: (1) IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero — For a given matching, is
its stability probability non-zero? (2) IsStabilityProbabilityOne — For a
given matching, is its stability probability one?
We additionally consider problems connected to, and more restricted
than, MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability: (1) ExistsCer-
tainlyStableMatching — Does there exist a matching that has stability
probability one? (2) ExistsPossiblyStableMatching — Does there exist a
matching that has non-zero stability probability?
Note that ExistsPossiblyStableMatching is straightforward to answer
for any of the three uncertainty models we consider here, since there exists
a stable matching for each deterministic preference profile that is a possible
realization of the uncertain preferences.
1.3 Results
Table 1 summarizes our main findings. Note that the complexity of each problem
is considered with respect to the input size, and that under the lottery and
joint probability models the size of the input could be exponential in n, namely
O(n! · 2n) for the lottery model and O((n!)2n) for the joint probability model,
where n is the number of agents on either side of the market.
We point out that StabilityProbability is #P-complete for the lot-
tery model even when each agent has at most two possible preferences,
but in P if one side has certain preferences. Additionally, we show that
IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero is in P for the lottery model if each agent
has at most two possible preferences. Note that StabilityProbability is open
for the compact indifference model when both sides may be uncertain, and we
also do not know the complexity of MatchingWithHighestStabilityPro-
bility in the lottery model, except when only a constant number of agents are
uncertain on the same side of the market.
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2 Preliminaries
In the Stable Marriage problem, there are two sets of agents. LetM denote a set
of n men and W a set of n women. We use the term agents when making state-
ments that apply to both men and women, and the term candidates to refer to
the agents on the opposite side of the market to that of an agent under consider-
ation. Each agent has a linearly ordered preference over the candidates. An agent
may be uncertain about his/her linear preference ordering. Let L denote the un-
certain preference profile for all agents. We denote by I = (M,W,L) an instance
of a Stable Marriage problem with Uncertain Linear Preferences (SMULP).
We say that a given uncertainty model is independent if any uncertain pref-
erence profile L under the model can be written as a product of uncertain pref-
erences La for all agents a, where all La’s are independent. Note that the lottery
and the compact indifference models are both independent, but the joint prob-
ability model is not.
A matching µ is a pairing of men and women such that each man is paired
with at most one woman and vice versa; defining a list of (man, woman) pairs
(m,w). We use µ(m) to denote the woman w that is matched to m and µ(w) to
denote the match for w. Given linearly ordered preferences, a matching is stable
if there is no pair (m,w) not in µ where m prefers w to his current partner in
µ, i.e., w ≻m µ(m), and vice versa. If such a pair exists, it constitutes a blocking
pair ; as the pair would prefer to defect and match with each other rather than
stay with their partner in µ. Given an instance of SMULP, a matching is certainly
stable if it is stable with probability 1.
The following extensions of SM will come in handy in proving our results.
The Stable Marriage problem with Partially ordered lists (SMP) is an extension
of SM in which agents’ preferences are partial orders over the candidates. The
Stable Marriage problem with Ties (SMT) is a special case of SMP in which
incomparability is transitive and is interpreted as indifference. Therefore, in SMT
each agent partitions the candidates into different ties (equivalence classes), is
indifferent between the candidates in the same tie, and has strict preference
ordering over the ties. In some practical settings some agents may find some
candidates unacceptable and prefer to remain unmatched than to get matched
to the unacceptable ones. SMP with Incomplete lists (SMPI) and SMT with
Incomplete lists (SMTI) captures these scenarios where each agent’s partially
ordered list contains only his/her acceptable candidates. A matching is super-
stable in an instance of SMPI if it is stable w.r.t. all linear extensions of the
partially ordered lists.
We define the certainly preferred relation ≻certa for agent a. We write b ≻
cert
a c
if and only if agent a prefers b over c with probability 1. Based on the cer-
tainly preferred relation, we can define a dominance relation D: Dm(w) =
{w} ∪ {w′ : w′ ≻certm w}; Dw(m) = {m} ∪ {m
′ : m′ ≻certw m}. Based on the no-
tion of the dominance relation, we present a useful characterization of certainly
stable matchings for independent uncertainty models.
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Lemma 1. A matching µ is certainly stable for an independent uncertainty
model if and only if for each pair {m,w}, µ(m) ∈ Dm(w) or µ(w) ∈ Dw(m).
Proof. Assume that there exists a pair {m,w} such that µ(m) /∈ Dm(w) or
µ(w) /∈ Dw(m). Then, m has non-zero probability of preferring w over µ(m) and
w has non-zero probability of preferring m over µ(w). But this means that µ has
non-zero probability of not being stable.
Assume that a matching µ is certainly stable. Then no blocking pair {m,w}
has non-zero probability of forming. This is only possible if the pair {m,w} is
part of the matching or one of m and w have zero probability of preferring the
blocking {m,w} over their current match in µ. In either case, µ(m) ∈ Dm(w) or
µ(w) ∈ Dw(m). ⊓⊔
We point out that certainly preferred relation can be computed in polynomial
time for all three models studied in this paper.
Certainly stable matchings are closely related to the notion of super-stable
matchings [5, 9]. In fact we can define a certainly stable matching using a termi-
nology similar to that of super-stability. Given a matching µ and an unmatched
pair {m,w}, we say that {m,w} very weakly blocks (blocks) µ if µ(m) 6≻certm w
and µ(w) 6≻certw m. The next claim then follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. A matching µ is certainly stable for an independent uncertainty
model if and only if it admits no very weakly blocking pair.
3 General Results
In this section, we first show that the complexity of all problems that we study
are the same for complete and incomplete lists. We then present some general
results that apply to multiple uncertainty models. We show that ExistsCer-
tainlyStableMatching can be solved in polynomial time for any independent
uncertainty model including lottery and compact indifference. We then prove
that, when the number of uncertain agents is constant and one side of the mar-
ket is certain, we can solve MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability
efficiently for each of the linear models.
3.1 The Case for Incomplete Lists
The next proposition explains that our efficient algorithms described for the case
of complete lists can be extended to incomplete lists. Additionally, our hardness
proofs for incomplete lists can be transformed for complete lists. In fact, all our
hardness reductions, except Theorem 9, are for complete lists so they trivially
extend to the case of incomplete lists.
Proposition 2. The complexity of each computational problem studied in this
paper are the same for complete and incomplete lists. Formally, if I is a linear
model with incomplete lists then we can construct an instance I ′ with complete
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lists such that for each matching µ in I there exists a corresponding match-
ing µ′ in I ′ with p(µ, I) = p(µ′, I ′), such that µ can be obtained from µ′ in
polynomial time. Furthermore, µ is one of the most stable matchings in I if
and only if the corresponding matching µ′ is one of the most stable matching
in I ′. Therefore a polynomial time algorithm solving StabilityProbability
or MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability for complete lists can be
used to solve the same problem for incomplete lists in polynomial time.
Proof. In the case of complete lists we assumed that we have an equal number
of men and women and everybody finds all candidates acceptable. When we
consider the problem with incomplete lists we mean that the sizes of the two
sets are not necessarily the same and not all the candidates are acceptable for
the agents. However, we assume that in all realization of the preference profiles
the same candidates are acceptable, so we only randomize on the preferences
over the acceptable partners. Suppose that I is an instance of a probabilistic
model with incomplete lists with setsM andW . Let us create the corresponding
instance I ′ with sets M ′ and W ′ in the following way. First we ensure that
|M ′| = |W ′| by adding enough agents to the short side of the market. Then we
complete the preference lists of each agent by adding the previously unacceptable
candidates to the end of her/his list according to a predetermined order, e.g. by
the indices of the agents. Suppose now that µ is a matching in I and X is the set
of matched men inM , whilst µ(X) = Y . Let us create a corresponding matching
µ′ in I ′ by extending µ with the unique stable matching for the subinstance
restricted to the unmatched agents. Namely, let µu be the stable matching that
matches M ′ \ X to W ′ \ Y in such a way that the kth pair contains the kth
man and the kth woman from M ′ \ X and W ′ \ Y , respectively according to
their indices, and let µ′ = µ ∪ µu. Now we claim that p(µ, I) = p(µ′, I ′). This
is because there is no blocking pair in (M ′ \X)× (W ′ \ Y ), and any other pair
is blocking for some preference profile in I if and only if it is blocking for the
corresponding preference profile in I ′, obviously. Furthermore, it is also clear
that among the extensions of µ, µ′ is the most stable one in I ′. Therefore µ is
one of the most stable matchings in I if and only if the corresponding extension,
µ′ is one of the most stable matchings in I ′. Thus an efficient algorithm for
StabilityProbability or MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability
(or other subproblems) for complete lists can also be used to solve the same
problems for the case of incomplete lists. This also implies that any hardness
result proved for incomplete lists holds also for complete lists. ⊓⊔
3.2 An Algorithm for the Lottery and Compact Indifference Models
Theorem 1. For any independent uncertainty model in which the certainly pre-
ferred relation is transitive and can be computed in polynomial time, ExistsCer-
tainlyStableMatching can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We prove this by reducing ExistsCertainlyStableMatching to the
problem of deciding whether an instance of SMP admits a super-stable matching
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or not. The latter problem can be solved in polynomial time using algorithm
SUPER-SMP in [13].
Let I = (M,W,L) be an instance of ExistsCertainlyStableMatching
under an independent uncertainty model, assuming that the certainly preferred
relation is transitive and can be computed in polynomial time. We construct an
instance I ′ = (M,W, p) of SMP, in polynomial time, as follows. The set of men
and women are unchanged. To create the partial preference ordering pa for each
agent a we do the following. W.l.o.g. assume that a is a man m. For every pair
of women w1 and w2 (i) if w1 ≻certainm w2 then (w1, w2) ∈ pm, denoting that
m (strictly) prefers w1 to w2 in I
′, (ii) if w2 ≻certainm w1 then (w2, w1) ∈ pm,
denoting that m (strictly) prefers w2 to w1 in I
′. We claim, and show, that I ′
admits a super-stable matching if and only if I admits a matching with stability
probability one. A matching µ is super-stable in I ′ if and only if it does not
admit a very weak blocking pair. A pair (m,w) unmatched in µ is a very weak
blocking pair if (i) m either prefers w to µ(m) or is indifferent between them,
and (ii) w either prefers m to µ(w) or is indifferent between them. Agent a is
indifferent between agents b and c under an SMP instance if neither (b, c) nor
(c, b) is in pa. It is easy to verify that an unmatched pair (m,w) in I
′ is a very
weak blocking pair in µ if and only if (µ(m), w) /∈ pm and (µ(w),m) /∈ pw.
Only if part: If I ′ admits a super-stable matching µ then µ is certainly stable
in I. Assume for a contradiction that µ is not certainly stable in I. It then follows
Lemma 1 that µ(m) /∈ Dm(w) and µ(w) /∈ Dw(m), implying that µ(m) 6≻strictm w
and µ(w) 6≻strictw m, and thus (µ(m), w) /∈ pm and (µ(w),m) /∈ pw. Therefore
(m,w) blocks µ in I ′, a contradiction.
If part: If I admits a certainly stable matching µ then µ is super-stable in
I ′. Assume, for a contradiction, that µ is not super-stable in I ′. Therefore there
exists a very weak blocking pair (m,w), implying that (µ(m), w) /∈ pm and
(µ(w),m) /∈ pw, which in turn implies that µ(m) 6≻strictm w and µ(w) 6≻
strict
w m.
The latter statement, coupled with the fact that m and w are not matched
together, implies that µ(m) /∈ Dm(w) and µ(w) /∈ Dw(m), and thus by Lemma
1 µ is not stable in I, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
3.3 An Algorithm for a Constant Number of Uncertain Agents
Theorem 2. When the number of uncertain agents is constant and one side of
the market is certain then MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability is
polynomial-time solvable for each of the linear models.
Proof. Let I = (M,W,L) be an instance of MatchingWithHighestStabili-
tyProbability and let X ⊆M be the set of uncertain agents with |X | = k for
a constant k. We consider all the possible matchings between X and W , where
their total number is K = n(n − 1) . . . (n − k). Let µi be such a matching for
i ∈ {1 . . .K}. The main idea of the proof is to show that there exist an exten-
sion of µi to M ∪W that has stability probability at least as high as any other
extension of µi. In this way we will need to compute this probability for only a
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polynomial number of matchings in n, that we can do efficiently for each model,
and then compare them and select the one with the highest probability.
So we take a matching µi between sets X and W . Let Y = µi(X) (i.e., the
partners of X in W ) and let M ′ =M \X and W ′ =W \ Y . First, we compute
the man-optimal matching µMi for the sub-instance I
′ on M ′ ∪W ′, that can be
done efficiently by the Gale-Shapley algorithm [4]. Now, if there exist a blocking
pair {m′, w} involving some certain agents m ∈M ′ and w ∈ Y for µ ∪ µMi in I,
then we can conclude that any extension of µi for I will have zero probability
of being stable. This is because any extension of µi for I that has a positive
probability of being stable must also be stable for the sub-instance I ′. If {m′, w}
is a blocking pair for µMi then it will remain blocking for any extension of µi for
I as well, since w has the same partner and the m′ cannot have a better partner
either. Thus we can exclude the extensions of µi from the further consideration
in this case.
Suppose now that there is no blocking pair of the form {m′, w}, as explained
above, for µMi in I. We truncate the preference lists of men inM
′ in the following
way. For each man m′ ∈ M ′ we remove all the women w′ ∈ W ′ from the list
of m′ that are less preferred by m′ than some woman in Y that finds m′ better
than her partner in µi. That is, we remove w
′ from the list of m′ if there exists
w ∈ Y such that m′ ≻w µi(w) and w ≻m′ w′. Let us denote the sub-instance
for M ′∪W ′ with the truncated lists as Iri . Now we compute the woman-optimal
matching, µWi in I
r
i . Let µ
∗
i = µi ∪ µ
W
i be the extended matching in I. This is
stable for the certain agents by the construction.
Finally, we will show that for any matching µ′i, that is an extension of µi to
I, the stability probability of µ′i is less than, or equal to, the stability probability
of µ∗i . If µ
′
i is not stable for the certain agents then µ
′
i has zero probability of
being stable, thus the statement holds. If µ′i is stable for the certain agents then
it must also be stable in Iri , and each woman in W
′ weakly prefers her partner
in µ∗i to her partner in µ
′
i, since she gets her optimal stable partner for I
r
i in µ
∗
i .
Therefore, if µ′i is stable under a preference profile then µ
∗
i will also be stable,
so the statement follows. Thus, there remain only a polynomial number (K)
of candidate matchings in n for which we have to compute the probabilities.
StabilityProbability is polynomial-time solvable for all the three models we
consider given that one side has certain preferences, as described in Theorems
3, 8, and 10. ⊓⊔
4 Lottery Model
In this section we focus on the lottery model.
Theorem 3. For the lottery model, if one side has certain preferences, Stabil-
ityProbability is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that men have certain preferences.
The following procedure gives us the stability probability of µ for any given µ.
(1) For each uncertain woman w identify those preferences that allow her not
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to form a blocking pair. We can do this in polynomial time as men have strict
preferences and therefore for each preference ordering of w we only need to look
up the (one and only) preference ordering of each m who w prefers to µ(w). (2)
For each uncertain woman w, add up the probabilities of all preference orderings
that pass the test in the first step. (3) multiply the added-up probabilities for
all w obtained in step (2). ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. For the lottery model, IsStabilityProbabilityOne can be
solved in linear time.
Proof. The problem is equivalent to checking whether the given matching µ
has non-zero probability of not being stable. This can be checked as follows. For
each possible pair of agents {m,w} that are not matched to each other, we check
whether they can form a blocking pair with non-zero probability. For this, we
just need to check whether m prefers w in some possible preference over µ(m)
and whether w prefers m in some possible preference over µ(w). ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. For the lottery model, IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero is
polynomial-time solvable when each agent has at most two possible preference
orderings.
Proof. The problem is to decide whether there is some preference ordering for
each agent (among the ones in their lottery) such that the given matching is
stable. If each agent has at most two possible preference orderings in their lottery,
we can reduce the problem to an instance ϕ of 2SAT, as follows.
Let {a1, . . . , an} and {b1, . . . , bn} be the two sets of agents. Moreover, for
each agent c and each i ∈ {1, 2}, let pref(c, i) denote the i-th preference in the
lottery for agent c.
We introduce a propositional variable for each preference pref(c, i)—which
we also call pref(c, i). Intuitively, these variables indicate which preference for
the agents we choose to make the matching stable.
For each agent c, we add the following clauses to ϕ, to ensure that for each
agent c there is exactly one preference that is selected: (pref(c, 1)∨pref(c, 2)) ∧
(¬pref(c, 1) ∨ ¬pref(c, 2)).
Then, we add clauses to ensure that the selected matching is stable.
For each agent c and each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Bc,i be the set of prefer-
ences pref(c′, i′)—for c′ 6= c and i′ ∈ {1, 2}—such that pref(c, i) and pref(c′, i′)
together lead to the given matching being unstable (with (c, c′) being a block-
ing pair). Then, for each c, i, we add the following clauses: (¬pref(c, i) ∨
¬pref(c′, i′)) for each pref(c′, i′) ∈ Bc,i.
The given matching is then stable if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Since ϕ is a
2CNF, this can be decided in linear time. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. For the lottery model, StabilityProbability is #P-complete,
even when each agent has at most two possible preferences.
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Proof. We show how to count the number of satisfying assignments for a 2CNF
formula using the problem StabilityProbability for the lottery model where
each agent has two possible preferences. Since this problem is #P-hard, we get
#P-hardness also for StabilityProbability.
Let ϕ be a 2CNF formula over the variables x1, . . . , xn. We firstly trans-
form ϕ to a 2CNF formula ϕ′ over the variables x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn that has
exactly the same number of satisfying assignments, and that satisfies the prop-
erty that each clause contains one variable among x1, . . . , xn and one variable
among y1, . . . , yn. We do so as follows. Firstly, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we add the
clauses (¬xi ∨yi) and (¬yi∨xi), ensuring that in each satisfying assignment the
variables xi and yi get assigned the same truth value. Then, for each clause of ϕ,
we replace one occurrence of a variable among x1, . . . , xn by the corresponding
variable among y1, . . . , yn, and we add the resulting clause to ϕ
′. For example,
if ϕ contains the clause (x1 ∨¬x3), we would add the clause (x1 ∨¬y3) to ϕ′. It
is readily verified that ϕ′ has the same number of satisfying assignments as ϕ.
Moreover, we may assume without loss of generality that for any two variables
of ϕ′, there is at most one clause of ϕ′ that contains both of these variables. If
in ϕ there are two variables x1 and x2 and clauses (x1∨x2) and (¬x1 ∨¬x2), for
instance, we can construct ϕ′ to contain the clauses (x1 ∨ y2) and (¬y1 ∨ ¬x2).
We now construct an instance of StabilityProbability. The sets of agents
that we consider are {x1, . . . , xn, a1, . . . , an} and {y1, . . . , yn, b1, . . . , bn}. The
matching that we consider matches xi to bi and matches yi to ai, for each 1 ≤
i ≤ n. This is depicted below. Each agent bi has only a single possible preference,
namely one where they prefer xi over all other agents. Similarly, each agent ai
has a single possible preference where they prefer yi over all other agents. In
other words, the agents ai and bi are perfectly happy with the given matching.
The agents xi and yi each have two possible preferences, that are each chosen
•
b1
•
x1
•
b2
•
x2
•
b3
•
x3
· · ·
•
bn
•
xn
•
y1
•
a1
•
y2
•
a2
•
y3
•
a3
· · ·
•
yn
•
an
with probability 12 . These two possible preferences are associated with setting
these variables to true or false, respectively. We describe how these preferences
are constructed for the agents xi. The construction for the preferences of the
agents yi is then entirely analogous.
Take an arbitrary agent xi. We show how to construct the two possible
preferences for agent xi, which we denote by pxi and p¬xi. Both of these possible
preferences are based on the following partial ranking: b1 > b2 > · · · > bn, and
we add some of the agents y1, . . . , yn to the top of this partial ranking, and the
remaining agents to the bottom of this partial ranking.
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To the ranking pxi we add exactly those agents yj to the top where ϕ
′ contains
a clause (¬xi ∨ yj) or a clause (¬xi ∨ ¬yj). All remaining agents we add to the
bottom. Similarly, to the ranking p¬xi we add exactly those agents yj to the
top where ϕ′ contains a clause (xi ∨ yj) or a clause (xi ∨¬yj). The rankings pyi
and p¬yi , for the agents yi, are constructed entirely similarly.
Now consider a truth assignment α : {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn} →
{0, 1}, and consider the corresponding choice of preferences for the
agents x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, where for each agent xi the preference pxi is chosen
if and only if α(xi) = 1, and for each agent yi the preference pyi is chosen if
and only if α(yi) = 1. Then α satisfies ϕ
′ if and only if the corresponding choice
of preferences leads to the matching being stable. Since each combination of
preferences is equally likely to occur, and there are 22n many combinations of
preferences, the probability that the given matching is stable is exactly q = s22n ,
where s is the number of satisfying truth assignments for ϕ. Therefore, given q, s
can be obtained by computing s = q22n. ⊓⊔
If each agent is allowed to have three possible preferences, then even the following
problem is NP-complete. The statement can be proved via a reduction from
Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C).
Theorem 7. For the lottery model, IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero is
NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in NP, since we only need to provide one profile that occurs
with non-zero probability for which the given matching is stable. We show NP-
hardness by giving a reduction from Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C). Let (X,C)
be an instance of X3C, where |X | = 3n for some n, and C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a
collection of sets ci ⊆ X , each of size 3. Moreover, let ci = {xℓi,1 , xℓi,2 , xℓi,3}, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The problem is to decide whether there is a subset C′ ⊆ C of
size exactly n such that
⋃
C′ = X .
We construct an instance of our problem as follows. We let {a1, . . . , an,
a′1, . . . , a
′
3n} and {b1, . . . , bn, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
3n} be the two sets of agents, we match ai
to bi—for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n— and we match a′j to b
′
j—for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 3n. This
is depicted below.
•
a1
•
b1
•
a2
•
b2
•
a3
•
b3
· · ·
•
an
•
bn
•
a′1
•
b′1
•
a′2
•
b′2
•
a′3
•
b′3
· · ·
•
a′3n
•
b′3n
Fig. 1. Illustration of the reduction
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Each agent ai prefers their matching to bi over any other possible match, i.e.,
agent ai has one preference, where bi is ranked first, and the rest of the agents
appear in some fixed order after bi.
Similarly, each agent b′j prefers their matching to a
′
j over any other possible
match. That is, agent b′j has one preference ordering in which a
′
j is ranked first
and the rest of the agents appear in some fixed order after a′j .
Then, for each agent bi, we add the following |C| possible preferences to the
lottery:
Pi,1 : a
′
ℓ1,1
> a′ℓ1,2 > a
′
ℓ1,3
> ai > · · ·
Pi,2 : a
′
ℓ2,1
> a′ℓ2,2 > a
′
ℓ2,3
> ai > · · ·
...
Pi,m : a
′
ℓm,1
> a′ℓm,2 > a
′
ℓm,3
> ai > · · ·
where in each preference the remaining agents appear in any (fixed) order af-
ter ai. In other words, bi prefers three agents a
′
j to their current match, and
these three form some set c ∈ C.
Finally, for each agent a′j , we add the following n possible preferences to the
lottery:
P ′j,1 : b2 > · · · > bn > b
′
j > b1 > b
′
1 > · · · > b
′
j−1 > b
′
j+1 > · · · > b
′
3n
P ′j,2 : b1 > b3 > · · · > bn > b
′
j > b2 > b
′
1 > · · · > b
′
j−1 > b
′
j+1 > · · · > b
′
3n
P ′j,3 : b1 > b2 > b4 > · · · > bn > b
′
j > b3 > b
′
1 > · · · > b
′
j−1 > b
′
j+1 > · · · > b
′
3n
...
...
P ′j,n : b1 > · · · > bn−1 > b
′
j > bn > b
′
1 > · · · > b
′
j−1 > b
′
j+1 > · · · > b
′
3n
That is, each agent a′j prefers each of the agents b1, . . . , bn, except one, to their
current match (and they never prefer any of the agents b′j′ for j
′ 6= j over their
current match).
We can show that there is a choice of preferences for the agents that makes
this matching stable if and only if (X,C) ∈ X3C.
(⇒) Firstly, suppose that there is a choice of preferences for the agents that
makes this matching stable. That is, for each agent bi there is some preference
ordering Pi,ℓi , and for each agent a
′
j there is some preference ordering P
′
j,kj
,
such that these orderings (together with the fixed preference orderings for the
agents ai and b
′
j) make this matching stable. Now, consider the set C
′ = {cℓ :
i ∈ [n], ℓ = ℓi}. We show that
⋃
C′ = X . To derive a contradiction, suppose
that this is not the case, that is, suppose that
⋃
C′ 6= X . Then, since |C′| =
n, |X | = 3n and for each c ∈ C′ it holds that |c| = 3, we know that there must
be some cℓ, cℓ′ ∈ C′ such that cℓ∩cℓ′ 6= ∅. Say that xj ∈ cℓ∩cℓ′ . Therefore, there
must be some i, i′ ∈ [n] such that both bi and bi′ prefer a′j over their current
match. On the other hand, a′j will prefer either bi or bi′ over their current match.
Therefore, either bi and a
′
j or bi′ and a
′
j will form a blocking pair. Thus, the
matching is not stable. From this we can conclude that
⋃
C′ = X .
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(⇐) Conversely, suppose that there exists some C′ ⊆ C of size exactly n such
that
⋃
C′ = X . Let C′ = {cℓ1 , . . . , cℓn}. Now, for each agent bi we pick some
preference ordering, and for each agent a′j we pick some preference ordering,
such that these orderings (together with the fixed preference orderings for the
agents ai and b
′
j) make the matching stable. For each agent bi, we pick the pref-
erence ordering Pi,ℓi , and for each agent a
′
j we pick the preference ordering P
′
j,kj
,
where kj ∈ [n] is the unique value such that xj ∈ cℓkj . It is straightforward to
verify that these preferences make the matching stable. ⊓⊔
We obtain the first corollary from Theorem 7 and the second from [16, Propo-
sition 8] and Theorem 7.
Corollary 1. For the lottery model, unless P = NP, there exists no polynomial-
time algorithm for approximating StabilityProbability of a given matching.
Corollary 2. For the lottery model, unless NP = RP, there is no FPRAS for
StabilityProbability.
5 Compact Indifference Model
The compact indifference model is equivalent to assuming that we are given an
instance of SMT and each linear order over candidates (each possible preference
ordering) is achieved by breaking ties independently at random with uniform
probabilities. It is easy to show that IsStabilityProbablityNonZero, Is-
StabilityProbablityOne, and ExistsCertainlyStableMatching are all
in P.
Proposition 3. For the compact indifference model, IsStabilityProbabili-
tyNonZero is in P.
Proof. This is equivalent to checking whether a given matching µ is weakly stable
in the given SMTI instance. To check this we only have to look for a blocking
pair, which can be done in polynomial time: take every possible pair (m,w) who
are not matched together and check whether they both strictly prefer each other
to their current partner. ⊓⊔
Proposition 4. For the compact indifference model, IsStabilityProbabili-
tyOne is in P.
Proof. The problem is polynomial-time solvable. We go through all the blocking
pairs and check if any blocking pair is feasible. For each blocking pair, we break
ties (if there are any) in favour of the blocking pair. Given that we break ties in
favour of the blocking pairs, if there exists a blocking pair that is feasible, the
stability probability is not one. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5. For the compact indifference model, ExistsCer-
tainlyStableMatching is in P.
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Proof. Deciding whether there is matching that is stable with probability one
is equivalent to deciding whether there is a matching that is stable w.r.t. all
refinements, a super-stable matching. Given an instance of SMTI one can decide
in polynomial time whether it admits a super-stable matching or not [12]. ⊓⊔
We do not yet know the complexity of computing the stability probability of
a given matching under the compact indifference model, but this problem can
be shown to be in P if one side has certain preferences.
Theorem 8. In the compact indifference model, if one side has certain prefer-
ences, StabilityProbability is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Assume, w.l.o.g., that men have certain preferences. The following pro-
cedure gives us the stability probability of any given matching µ. (1) For each
uncertain woman w identify those men with whom she can potentially form a
blocking pair. That is, thosem such that w≻mµ(m) and w is indifferent between
m and her partner in µ. Assume there are k of such men. The probability of w
not forming a blocking pair with any men is then 1
k+1 . (2) Multiply the proba-
bilities from step 1. ⊓⊔
We next show that MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability is NP-
hard. For an instance I of SMT and matching µ, let p(µ, I) denote the probability
of µ being stable, and let pS(I) = max{p(µ, I)|µ is a matching in I}, that is the
maximum probability of a matching being stable. A matching µ is said to be
weakly stable if there exists a tie-breaking rule where µ is stable. Therefore a
matching µ has positive probability of being stable if and only if it is weakly
stable. Furthermore, if the number of possible tie-breaking is N then any weakly
stable matching has a probability of being stable at least 1
N
.
An extreme case occurs if we have one woman only with n men, where the
woman is indifferent between all men. In this case any matching (pair) has a
1
n
probability of being stable. An even more unfortunate scenario is when we
have n men and n women, each women is indifferent between all men, and each
man ranks the women in a strict order in the same way, e.g. in the order of
their indices. In this case, the probability that the first woman picks her best
partner, and thus does not block any matching is 1
n
. Suppose that the first woman
picked her best partner, the probability that the second woman also picks her
best partner from the remaining n − 1 men is 1
n−1 , and so on. Therefore, the
probability that an arbitrary complete matching is stable is 1
n(n−1)...2 =
1
n! .
Theorem 9. For the compact indifference model MatchingWithHighest-
StabilityProbability is NP-hard, even if only one side of the market has
uncertain agents.
Proof. For an instance I of SMTI, let opt(I) denote the maximum size of a weakly
stable matching in I. Halldorsson et al. [7] showed [in the proof of Corollary 3.4]
that given an instance I of SMTI of size n, where only one side of the market
has agents with indifferences and each of these agents has a single tie of size
15
two, and any arbitrary small positive ǫ, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the
following two cases: (1) opt(I) ≥ 21−ǫ27 n and (2) opt(I) <
19+ǫ
27 n.
When choosing ǫ so that 0 < ǫ < 12 we can simplify the above cases to
(1) opt(I) > 4154n, since opt(I) ≥
21−ǫ
27 n >
41
54n and (2) opt(I) <
39
54n, since
opt(I) < 19+ǫ27 n <
39
54n.
Therefore, the number of agents left unmatched on either side of the market
is less than 1354n in the first case and more than
15
54n in the second case. Let us
now extend instance I to a larger instance of SMTI I ′ as follows. Besides the
n men M = {m1, . . . ,mn} and n women W = {w1, . . . , wn}, we introduce
13
54n
men X = {x1, . . . xk} and another
n
27 men Y = {y1, . . . yl} and
n
27 women Z =
{z1, . . . zl}. Furthermore, for each yj ∈ Y , we introduce nmen Y j = {y
j
1, . . . , y
j
n}.
We create the preferences of I ′ as follows. The preferences of men M remain the
same. For each woman w ∈ W we append the men X and then Y at the end of
her list in the order of their indices. Each man xi ∈ X has only all the women
W in his list in the order of their indices. Furthermore, each yj ∈ Y has all the
women W first in his preference list in the order or their indices and then zj .
Let each zj ∈ Z has yj as first choice and then all the men Y j in one tie of
size n. Each man in Y j has only zj in his list. We will show that in case one
pS(I
′) ≥ 12n , whilst in case two pS ≤ (
1
n
)
n
27 . Therefore, for n > 227, it is NP-hard
to decide which of the two separate intervals contains the value pS(I
′).
To show the above statement, suppose first that we have the first case, so
opt(I) > 4154n and therefore less than
13
54n women are left unmatched in a max-
imum size weakly stable matching µ for I, denoted by Wu ⊂ W . We extend
µ to µ′ for I ′ as follows. We assign all the women in Wu to men in X in the
unique stable way, namely we pair them in a mutually increasing order of their
indices. Since |X | > |Wu|, we now matched all women in W , and left some men
in X unmatched in µ′. We complete the matching by assigning yj to zj for each
j = 1, . . . , n and leaving all of the men in Y j for all j unmatched. We shall see
that no matter how we break the ties in I ′, blocking pair can appear between
the original I agents only, and therefore the probability of µ′ being stable in I ′
is the same as the probability of µ being stable in I. Since we have at most n
ties in I, each of length two, the number of different tie-breakings is at most 2n,
out of which at least one is stable. Therefore p(µ, I ′) = p(µ, I) ≥ 12n .
In the second case, opt(I) < 3954n and therefore more than
15
54n women are
left unmatched in any weakly stable matching µ for I. Let µ′ be one of the
most stable matchings in I ′. First we have to note that the restriction of µ′ to
I must be weakly stable in I, since otherwise p(µ′, I ′) = 0. Let Wu denote the
set of women that are not matched to any man from M in µ′. According to our
assumption |Wu| >
15
54n, whilst |X | + |Y | =
15
54n, therefore in order to avoid a
certain blocking pair betweenWu and X∪Y we shall match all the men in X∪Y
to women in Wu in the only stable way (in the order of indices, where men in
X are coming before men in Y ), an leaving some women in Wu unmatched in
µ′. However, in this case no agent zj ∈ Z can be matched to yj, and therefore,
even if there was no potential blocking pair between agents of I, the probability
that zj is matched the best partner from Y
j is 1
n
independently for each zj ∈ Z.
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Therefore the probability of µ′ being stable is at most ( 1
n
)
n
27 , which completes
the proof of the first statement.
Regarding the NP-hardness of finding one of the most stable matchings, we
shall prove that we can decide between the two cases according to the number of
unmatched women in W in the restriction of µ′ to I, where µ′ is one of the most
stable matchings in I ′. To see this, let Wu denote again the set of women that
are not matched to any man inM under µ′. In the first case, when opt(I) > 4154n,
it must be the case that |Wu| <
15
54n, since otherwise p(µ
′, I) would be less than
( 1
n
)
n
27 and could not achieve 12n , that is the minimum value for pS(I
′), as shown
in the above argument. Whilst, in the second case |Wu| >
15
54n must hold, since
opt(I) < 3954n was assumed. ⊓⊔
6 Joint Probability Model
In this section, we examine problems concerning the joint probability model.
Theorem 10. For the joint probability model, StabilityProbability can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof. The probability that a given matching is stable is equivalent to the prob-
ability weight of the preference profiles for which the matching is stable. This
can be checked as follows. We check the preference profiles for which the given
matching is stable (for one profile, this can be checked in O(n2)). Then we add
the probabilities of those profiles for which the matching is stable. The sum of
the probabilities is the probability that the matching is stable. ⊓⊔
Corollary 3. For the joint probability model, IsStabilityProbabilityNon-
Zero and IsStabilityProbabilityOne can be solved in polynomial time.
For the joint probability model, the problem ExistsCertainlyStableMatch-
ing is equivalent to checking whether the intersection of the sets of stable match-
ings of the different preference profiles is empty or not.
Theorem 11. For the joint probability model, ExistsCertainlyStable-
Matching is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in NP, since computing StabilityProbability can be
done in polynomial time by Theorem 10. The NP-hardness proof is by reduction
from 3-Colorability. Let G = (V,E) be a graph specifying an instance of 3-
Colorability, where V = {v1, . . . , vn}. We construct an instance I of SMULP
assuming the joint probability model.
For each vertex vi ∈ V , we introduce three men mi,1,mi,2,mi,3 and three
women wi,1, wi,2, wi,3. Then, we introduce one preference profile P0 that ensures
that every certainly stable matching matches—for each i ∈ [n]—each mi,j to
some wi,j′ and, vice versa, each wi,j to some mi,j′ , for j, j
′ ∈ [3]. Moreover,
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it ensures that for each i ∈ [n], exactly one of three matchings between the
men mi,j and the women wi,j must be used:
(1) mi,1 is matched to wi,1, mi,2 is matched to wi,2, and mi,3 is matched to wi,3;
(2) mi,1 is matched to wi,2, mi,2 is matched to wi,3, and mi,3 is matched to wi,1; or
(3) mi,1 is matched to wi,3, mi,2 is matched to wi,1, and mi,3 is matched to wi,2;
Intuitively, choosing one of the matchings (1)–(3) for the agents mi,j , wi,j corre-
sponds to coloring vertex vi with one of the three colors in {1, 2, 3}.
Then, for each edge e = {vi1 , vi2} ∈ E, and for each color c ∈ {1, 2, 3},
we introduce a preference profile Pe,c that ensures that in any certainly sta-
ble matching, the agents mi1,j , wi1,j and the agents mi2,j, wi2,j cannot both be
matched to each other with matching (c). We let each preference profile appear
with non-zero probability (e.g., we take a uniform lottery over all the preference
profiles that we introduced). As a result, any certainly stable matching directly
corresponds to a proper 3-coloring of G.
A detailed description of the preference profiles P0 and Pe,c and a proof of
correctness for this reduction follows.
In P0, for each i ∈ [n], the preferences for mi,j , wi,j are as follows:
mi,1 : wi,1, wi,2, wi,3,−−− wi,1 : mi,2,mi,3,mi,1,−−−
mi,2 : wi,2, wi,3, wi,1,−−− wi,2 : mi,3,mi,1,mi,2,−−−
mi,3 : wi,3, wi,1, wi,2,−−− wi,3 : mi,1,mi,2,mi,3,−−−
Next, we continue with the preference profiles Pe,c. Take an arbitrary e =
{vi1 , vi2} ∈ E and an arbitrary c ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In Pe,c, the preferences for mi,j , wi,j
for each i ∈ [n] \ {i1, i2} are exactly the same as in P0. Only the preferences
for mi1,j , wi1,j and mi2,j , wi2,j differ from P0; namely, we construct these pref-
erences as follows.
For mi1,j , wi1,j , we start with preferences that (i) for all mi1,j
have wi1,1, wi1,2, wi1,3 as top three choices, (ii) for all wi1,j havemi1,1,mi1,2,mi1,3
as top three choices, (iii) admit only matchings (1), (2), and (3) as stable match-
ings between the agentsmi1,j , wi1,j , and (iv) for the menmi1,j the matching (c) is
the worst option among the matchings (1), (2), and (3). Similarly, formi2,j , wi2,j ,
we start with preferences that satisfy conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), and addition-
ally satisfy the condition (iv′) that for the women wi2,j the matching (c) is the
worst option among the matchings (1), (2), and (3). Then, we modify the pref-
erences for mi1,1 and wi2,1 slightly. For mi1,1, we insert wi2,1 between his second
and third preferred woman. Similarly, for wi2,1, we insert mi1,1 between her sec-
ond and third preferred man. As a result, mi1,1 and wi2,1 form a blocking pair in
this preference profile if both the agents mi1,j , wi1,j and the agents mi2,j , wi2,j
are matched to each other using matching (c)—and not if either set of agents is
matched to each other using some other matching (c′).
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For example, consider e = {vi1 , vi2} and c = 2. The preferences for the
agents mi1,j , wi1,j and mi2,j, wi2,j in the preference profile Pe,c are as follows:
mi1,1 : wi1,1, wi1,3,wi2,1, wi1,2,−−− mi2,1 : wi2,2, wi2,3, wi2,1,−−−
mi1,2 : wi1,2, wi1,1, wi1,3,−−− mi2,2 : wi2,3, wi2,1, wi2,2,−−−
mi1,3 : wi1,3, wi1,2, wi1,1,−−− mi2,3 : wi2,1, wi2,2, wi2,3,−−−
wi1,1 : mi1,3, mi1,2,mi1,1,−−− wi2,1 : mi2,1,mi2,2,mi1,1,mi2,3,−−−
wi1,2 : mi1,1, mi1,3,mi1,2,−−− wi2,2 : mi2,2,mi2,3,mi2,1,−−−
wi1,3 : mi1,2, mi1,1,mi1,3,−−− wi2,3 : mi2,3,mi2,1,mi2,2,−−−
We argue that G has a proper 3-coloring if and only if there is a certainly
stable matching for the probability distribution over preference profiles that we
constructed.
(⇒) Firstly, suppose that G has a proper 3-coloring, say χ : V → {1, 2, 3}.
We can then construct a certainly stable matching as follows. For each i ∈ [n], we
match the agents mi,j , wi,j to each other using matching (ci), where ci = χ(vi).
Clearly, this matching is stable for P0. Moreover, because χ is a proper 3-coloring
of G, it is straightforward to verify that this matching is also stable for each Pe,c.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that there is a certainly stable matching. We know
that in this matching, each man mi,j must be matched to some woman wi,j′ , and
vice versa, each woman wi,j must be matched to some man mi,j′ . If this were not
the case, the matching would not be stable for P0, and thus not certainly stable.
Moreover, by a similar argument, we know that for each i ∈ [n], the matching
between the men mi,j and the women wi,j must be one of the matchings (1), (2),
or (3). We can then construct a 3-coloring χ : V → {1, 2, 3} as follows. For
each i ∈ [n], we let χ(vi) = ci, where (ci) is the matching used in the certainly
stable matching to match the men mi,j and the women wi,j to each other.
We argue that χ is a proper 3-coloring of G. Suppose that this is not the
case, that is, that there is some e = {vi1 , vi2} such that χ(vi1) = χ(vi2 ) = c. Now
consider the preference profile Pe,c. By construction of χ, we know that in the
certainly stable matching, both the agentsmi1,j , wi1,j and the agents mi2,j , wi2,j
are matched to each other using matching (c). However, then by construction
of Pe,c, mi1,1 and wi2,1 form a blocking pair in Pe,c. This is a contradiction with
our assumption that the matching we considered is certainly stable. From this,
we can conclude that χ is a proper 3-coloring of G. ⊓⊔
By modifying the proof of Theorem 11, the following can also be proved.
Corollary 4. For the joint probability model, ExistsCertainlyStable-
Matching is NP-complete, even when there are only 16 preference profiles in
the lottery.
Proof. We show this by modifying the proof of Theorem 11. We know that 3-
Colorability is NP-hard already when restricted to graphs of degree 4 [1]. We
use the reduction in the proof of Theorem 11, and we assume that the given
graph G has degree 4. Then, by Vizing’s Theorem [15], we know that we can
give a proper edge coloring of G that uses at most 5 colors. Moreover, we can find
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such an edge coloring in polynomial time. Then, since in the proof of Theorem 11,
in each preference profile Pe,c with e = {vi1 , vi2}, only the preferences for the
agents mi1,j , wi1,j ,mi2,j, wi2,j differ from P0, we can, for each color c ∈ {1, 2, 3},
combine the preference profiles Pe,c for all edges e that are colored with the same
color. This results in only 16 preference profiles: P0, and a preference profile for
each of the 5 edge colors and each of the 3 vertex colors. ⊓⊔
7 Future work
First we note that we left open two outstanding questions, as described in Table
1. In this paper we focused on the problem of computing a matching with the
highest stability probability. However, a similarly reasonable goal could be to
minimize the expected number of blocking pairs. It would also be interesting
to investigate some further realistic probability models, such as the situation
when the candidates are ranked according to some noisy scores (like the SAT
scores in the US college admissions). This would be a special case of the joint
probability model that may turn out to be easier to solve. Finally, in a follow-up
paper we are planning to investigate another probabilistic model that is based
on independent pairwise comparisons.
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